The Treasury Department said in a statement that Wednesday's designations target 32 people and organizations that run various procurement networks and are located in Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, China, Hong Kong, India, Germany, and Ukraine.
"These networks pose a threat to US and allied personnel in the Middle East and to commercial shipping in the Red Sea,"
the department said in a statement.
Tehran has been accused bythe United States, its European allies, and Israel of using its nuclear program as a cover for attempts to gain the capacity to create bombs. Iran claims that its nuclear program is solely intended for peaceful uses.
The amount of highly enriched uranium Iran has produced and stored is "a matter of serious concern," according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN's nuclear watchdog, which urged Iran to permit IAEA officials to assess nuclear installations.
"It is critical that the Agency is able to verify the inventories of previously declared nuclear material in Iran as soon as possible in order to allay its concerns ... regarding the possible diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful use,"
it added.
Western nations claim that Iran's high degree of enrichment has no civil rationale.
Iran possessed 440.9 kg of uranium enriched to up to 60% in uranium hexafluoride form prior to the strikes, according to IAEA estimates. This uranium can readily be further enriched. According to an IAEA standard, that is sufficient for ten nuclear bombs if it is further enriched.
How will these sanctions affect Iran’s missile and UAV procurement networks?
All property and interests of the designated companies and individualities under U.S. governance are firmed , and U.S. persons are banned from engaging with them. This creates fiscal insulation and compliance pitfalls encyclopedically. The warrants identify and strike frontal companies operating in countries like Hong Kong, China, the UAE, and Turkey, which Iran uses to circumvent being restrictions and land military- grade electronic factors, UAV machines, and bullet forces.
By cutting off access to transnational suppliers of binary- use electronics, bullet guidance technology, radars, UAV factors, and fuel constituents, the warrants hamper Iran's capability to sustain and expand its ballistic bullet and UAV capabilities.
These measures impel global fiscal institutions, businesses, and governments to be watchful against inadvertently supporting Iran’s procurement networks, reducing Iran’s options for sourcing sensitive accoutrements .